Fichte's Synthesis of the Exchange of Substantiality

March 17, 2025

In this blog post, I offer a line-by-line interpretation of Fichte’s synthesis of substantial exchange, §4.E.III.2.b.β of the 1794 Foundation of the Entire Science of Knowledge (Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, hereafter: Foundation). This section is one of the most important passages in the entire Theoretical Part, i.e. Part II of the Foundation, and my characterization of this synthesis as offered in my previous blog post does not adhere close enough to Fichte’s argument as it ought to.

A general summary of my interpretation is as follows:

This passage is concerned with the relationship between, on the one hand, judging that something is the case, i.e. judging p, and, on the other hand, withholding judgment with regard to p.
This passage asks the question: when are we justified in judging p, and when are we instead required to withold our judgment regarding p? This passage thus asks the question: what is our warrant to judge that things are thus and so? In other words: what justifies objective knowledge? Seen this way, the passage directly bears on the central topic of Part II of the Foundation, the question of how knowledge is possible.
Fichte unfolds his solution by arguing that our warrant to judge objectively is explained by our ability to simultaneously hold the judgment p and consider the possibility that p is false. Fichte is out to show that alongside our acts of judgment, there exists a cognitive state in which judgments are suspended and reconsidered. This is the state of “determinability” (Bestimmbarkeit).
The concept of determinability replaces Kant’s notion of sensibility, radically redefining sensibility as a space in which multiple judgments complete with one another. Sensibility is thus no longer the concept-free counterpart to conceptual determination. Instead, sensibility is a state of suspended judgment, in which multiple judgments are considered on the basis of perceptual and conceptual evidence that are themselves judgmental acts.
Fichte’s synthesis of substance thus describes objectivity as emerging from the interplay between “determinate” judgment, on the one hand, with the state of “determinability”, on the other hand, a state in which new, competing judgments are considered, and either adapted or rejected, as the case may be.
The description of objectivity as composed of the synthesis of “determinate” and “determinable” knowledge throws light on the Theoretical Principle of Part II of the Foundation, the principle that “The Self posits itself as determined by the Not-Self.” According to the account of objectivity given in this synthesis, the self-determined determination by the “Not-Self” consists in the interplay between judging things to be thus and so, and always, at the same time, considering alternative, completing judgments of what is the case.

Part 0: Fichte’s Summary

Section §4.E.III.2.b.β (hereafter: the Section) begins with a summary of what Fichte is going to argue for:

The form of exchange in substantiality, and the matter of the same [i.e. the matter of exchange in substantiality] should mutually determine one another.

Die Form des Wechsels in der Substantialität, und die Materie desselben sollen sich gegenseitig bestimmen. (Foundation 115)

This is Fichte’s characteristic formula of defining “form” and “matter” and arguing for their interdetermination (see the full diagram of Fichte’s system, in which this process occurs four different times). We can group Fichte’s treatment of this formula into three parts, which we will examine in turn:

I. Definition of “form” and “matter”.

II. Considering the incorrect hypotheses that form determines matter and matter determines form.

III. Explaining the correct hypothesis that matter and form “mutually determine one another” (“sich gegenseitig bestimmen”).

Part I: The Form and Matter of the Exchange of Substance

In this section I argue that the “exchange of substantiality” describes an exchange between two relationships one has to judgment:

judging p, where p refers to a proposition, an assertoric judgment of the form: “Socrates is mortal.”
suspending, or withholding judgment with regards to p, which I denote as: <p, ~p> (one can read this as: “either p or not p”). In this state of suspended judgment, we consider the two contradictory judgments “Socrates is mortal” and “Socrates is not mortal.”

The “exchange” describes the movement from one of these states to the other. For example, in one moment I judge p, and in another moment I suspend my judgment p because I am now unsure about whether p is true. The other example of the exchange goes in the opposite direction: at the moment, I am unsure about whether p is the case, but in the next moment, I arrive at a determination that, yes, p is, in fact, the case.

Note that this follows a traditional distinction concerning judgment that runs from Aristotle to Lock: one can either assent to a judgment (“assensus, ponere aliquid”) or withhold assent (suspensio assensus).¹

We will see that the “matter of the exchange” refers to these two different judgmental attitudes: the state of judging, and the state of withholding judgment. The “matter of the exchange” asks: what is being exchanged? The answer is: two states are being exchanged, the state of judging, and the state of withholding judgment. The “form of the exchange” refers to the contrary nature of these two states. The “form of the exchange” asks: what is the relationship between the two things being exchanged? The answer is: these two states are contrary to one another: if you are judging, you are not suspending judgment, and if you are suspending judgment, then you are not judging.

The Form of Exchange

Let us now being with Fichte’s formulation:

The form of the exchange consists in the members of the exchange mutually excluding one another and being excluded by one another.

Die Form des Wechsels besteht im gegenseitigen Auschliessen und Ausgeschlossenswerden der Wechselglieder durcheinander. (Foundation 115)

The form of exchange is contrariness. In other words, “exclusion”, “mutual exclusion” refers here to logical exclusion. The form of the exchange says that two contrary things, x and y, cannot both be the case (at the same time, in the same way, etc). If x is true, then y is false, and if y is true, then x is false. The contradiction is between two “members of the exchange”. The members of the exchange are described as follows.

The first member:

If A is posited as absolute totality, then B is excluded from the sphere of A and put in the undetermined, but determinable sphere B.

Wird A gesetzt, als absolute Totalität, so wird B aus der Sphäre desselben ausgeschlossen, und gesetzt in die unbestimmte, aber bestimmbare Sphäre B. (Foundation 115)

The second member:

Visa versa: if B is posited (if we reflect on B as posited), then A is excluded from the absolute totality; the sphere A is namely no longer absolutely totality, but is rather together with B, part of an undetermined but determinable sphere.

Umgekehrt, so wie B gesetzt wird (auf B als gesetzt, reflectirt wird), wird A ausgeschlossen aus der absoluten Totalität; nemlich die Sphäre A ist nun nicht mehr absolute Totalität, sondern sie ist zugleich mit B Theil einer unbestimmten, aber bestimmbaren Sphäre.(Foundation 115)

If we substitute “A” and “B” for “p” and “~p”, we can see that the first “member of the exchange” (Wechselglied) is the act of judgment. It is the act of judging p, where “p” is a simple assertoric judgment like: “The piece of iron is at rest.” When I judge p, I exclude the contradictory judgment ~p: “If A is posited as absolute totality, then B is excluded…”. When I judge that the piece of iron is at rest, I exclude the possibility that the piece of iron is in motion.² In the moment I judge p, I judge that p and only p is the case. In Fichte’s language, I ‘posit p as absolute totality’ of what is the case regarding p. “…then B [or ~p] is excluded from the sphere of A [or p]’.

The second “member of the exchange”, is the state of suspending judgment. When I suspend judgment regarding p, I am thereby declaring that either p or not ~p is the case. The “totality” of possible judgments concerning p now contains two contradictory judgments: p and ~p - either one of which might be the case. p and ~p are now “together…part of an undetermined, but determinable sphere.”

Let us now return to Fichte’s definition of the form of the exchange: namely the “mutual exclusion” of the “members of the exchange”. Either I judge p, or I withold my judgment regarding p, but not both. They are two contrary states and thus ‘mutually exclude one another’.

Fichte’s example of a substantial exchnage

Here is Fichte’s example of this exchange:

Posit iron in general and in itself; there you have a determined, complete concept, that fills its sphere. Posit iron as moving forward; there you have a characteristc that does not lie in that concept and that is thus excluded from it [i.e. the concept]. However, when you do, in fact, attribute motion to the piece of iron, then the previously determined concept of the piece of iron is no longer determined, but rather merely determinable; we are missing in the concept [of the piece of iron] a determination, that we will in time determine to be attraction via a magnet.

Setzet Eisen überhaupt und an sich; so habt ihr einen bestimmten vollständigen Begriff, der seine Sphäre füllt. Setzet das Eisen sich fortbewegend; so habt ihr ein Merkmal, das in jenem Begriffe nicht liegt, und demnach von ihm ausgeschlossen ist. Wie ihr aber diese Bewegung doch dem Eisen zuschreibt; so ist der vorher bestimmte Begriff des Eisens nicht mehr bestimmt, sondern bloss bestimmbar; es fehlt in ihm eine Bestimmung, die ihr zu seiner Zeit als Anziehbarkeit durch den Magnet bestimmen werdet. (Foundation 115)

Let us break this example into the two members of the exchange:

the first member: the iron is stationary
the second member: ’the previously determined concept of the piece of iron is no longer determined…'

The first member of the exchange: “The iron is stationary”

Fichte’s example is more complicated that a simple assertoric judgment. This is because one of his argumentative aims in the Section is to disabuse us of the notion that the world of experience consists of substances with essential properties. This is because Fichte wants to argue that every judgment about what is the case must be answerable to experience, and if we judge something to be a substance of a certain kind, then we thereby affirm certain essential properties of that substance, properties that experience might not, in fact, bear out as being, in fact, essential. This is a problem because, as Fichte will argue, every judgment about what is the case is subject to experience. In Fichte’s view, there are no judgments of experience that we get, so to speak, for free, i.e. judgments that apply absolutely, solely on the basis of other judgments. An example of such ‘free’ judgments would, for example, be judgments that are gained through logical inference based on other judgments, for example via modus ponens. To the extent that a judgment refers to experience, and not solely to logical principles, it is always subject to correction.

Fichte’s example here gives an example of a supposed essential property, namely: a piece of iron is an inert mass, and it is an essential property of an inert mass that it will not move unless being acted upon by a mechanical force. We can translate Fichte’s notion of essential properties mutatis mutandis into logical statements, without loosing his argument. So the logical form of Fichte’s example can be expressed as a simple syllogism :

(a): A piece of iron will not move unless being acted on by an external mechanical force.
(b): There is no mechanical force acting on this piece of iron.
Therefore (c): this piece of iron is at rest.

Fichte’s example includes this entire syllogism and not just the conclusion “This piece of iron is at rest” because Fichte is concerned here not just with judgments of direct perception, but also with how we explain experience. Thus a person might originally start with the assertoric judgment “This piece of iron is at rest”, and then we might ask the person to explain why that judgment is so. The explanation could be the syllogism given above. This progression from assertoric judgment, i.e. saying that something is so, to apodictic judgment, i.e. saying why something must be so, describes our relationship to experience: in judging things to be thus and so, I am also committing myself to giving an explanation, when called upon, about why they must be thus and so.³ Fichte’s example of judgment in this Section reflects the fact that, although objective judgment might begin with assertoric judgments that directly appeal to perception (“The piece of iron is at rest”/“I see the piece of iron at rest”), our grasp of objectivity intrisically moves toward judgments that are apodictic, that justify judgments of perception, explaining why they must be the case. However, as we see in the second member of the exchange, such apodictic judgments still remain fallible. Even the explanation for why a piece of iron must be a rest, can be refuted by experience, if it turns out that the piece of iron is not at rest.

The second member of the exchange: “The previously determined concept…is no longer determined”

The judgment from the first member of the exchange that gets suspended in Fichte’s example is the judgment (c): “this piece of iron is at rest”. We no longer know under what circumstances the iron will or will not move.

As with the first member of the exchange, Fichte’s example in more complicated than this, because he is mixing apodictic, or explanatory judgments, with simple assetoric judgments of perception. The idea is that our explanation of why the piece of iron is at rest fails because it cannot account for the fact that, counter to our explanation for why the iron is at rest, we in fact perceive the iron to be in motion. Our explanatory model of the world has broken down. Before, we could decide when the iron is at rest based on the input of judgment “A piece of iron will not move unless…by..mechanical form” and the judgment “There is no mechanical force at play here”. Now that model has been proven wrong, so that, aside from observing the iron directly, we are not in a position to predict or explain its behavior: “we are missing in the concept [of the piece of iron] a determination that we will in time determine to be attraction via a magnet.” Once we augment our Newtonian understanding of the natural world with a theory of magnetism, then our model will work again.

Fichte’s example shows that we conceptually determine the world through a mix of direct perceptual judgments (“The piece iron I see before me is moving”) and inferences based on other judgments (“Magnets only move under certain conditions, which are not fulfilled here. Ergo…” ). The “exchange” he describes is meant to show that our conceptual determination of reality is not absolute, but rather alway subject to revision, and this is only possible if, alongside the notion of “determining” the world to be thus and so, we also attend to a state of “determinability”, a state in which we suspend whatever judgment we had and weigh competing judgments based on the evidence presented in experience. Fichte’s definition of the “form” of substantial exchange makes the starting argument: there exists this state of determinability, which exists alongside the act of conceptual determination, and these two states are contradictory; they exclude one another.

The matter of the exchange

The matter of substantial exchange refers to the meaning, the sense of each of the two states that comprise the exchange. The matter is thus the judgment p and the suspension of the judgment p: <p, ~p>.

In this Section, Fichte follows the schema that he always follows in his “syntheses” of form and matter, defining first the form, and second the matter. In fact, Fichte, in this synthesis, would have been better served to first define the “matter” of the exchange, i.e. identify judgment and suspended judgment as the two things whose interaction he is investigating, and then, in a second step define the “form” of the exchange, which then consists in pointing out that these two states contradict one another. In defining form first, in describing how p and <p, ~p> contradict one another, he has already defined matter, namely, p and <p, ~p>. The definition of the matter of the exchange thus mostly serves to reformulate what is already said in the definition of form. Some of the new formulations, however, help to flesh out the picture Fichte drew in the definition of form.

Fichte writes:

As far as the matter of the exchange is concerned: it is immediately clear that in the description we just gave of the form of the exchange, it is unclear what in fact the totality is: if B is excluded, then the sphere of A fills the totality; if, on the contrary, B is posited, then both spheres, that of A and B fill the determined, but determinable totality.

Die Materie des Wechsels anbelangend, ist sogleich klar, dass in der Form desselben, wie sie soeben dargelegt worden, unbestimmt bleibt, welches die eigentliche Totalität sey. Soll B ausgeschlossen werden, so füllt die Sphäre von A die Totalität; soll im Gegentheil B gesetzt werden, so füllen beide Sphären, die von B und von A die zwar unbestimmte, aber bestimmbare Totalität. (Foundation 116)

This is a reformulation of what was said in the definiton of matter. The exchange is an exchange between two notions of totality, where ’totality’ can be understood as ’everything that can be said with respect to p’. When I judge p, I exclude ~p as a possibility. When I am uncertain about p, then either p or ~p are possible; they, together “fill the totality.” Fichte is reformulating here the reason that these two states are contraries: they make competing claims about what the “totality” is - they make competing claims with regard to p.

Note that we are explaining the exchange as concerning contradictory judgments p and ~p, whereas Fichte’s A and B seem to stand for contrary, rather than contradictory judgments. Fichte does, for example, refer to contradictory judgment in the synthesis of the exchange of causality, refering to the judgments “X” and “– X” (see Foundation 99). That fact that he is not using that notation here, suggests that A and B are not contradictory judgments. We will deal with this discrepancy in the conclusion of the synthesis. At this point it is enough to say that treating A and B as contradictory judgments is a convenient simplification that we can correct when it is relevant. Arguably, Fichte, himself, invites this simplification in his example of the piece of iron, for, depending on one’s view of rest and motion, being in motion and being at rest can be considered contradictory predications, rather than mere contraries. Motion and rest at least have more of a contradictory nature than, say, blue and red, which are clearly mere contraries.

The remainder of Fichte’s definition of the matter of the exchange contains two terms that I want to pick out because they will be important for the progress of his argument: the concept of “hovering” (schweben), and the concept of the “determinability of the totality” (die Bestimmbarkeit der Totalität).

Regarding “hovering”, Fichte says:

If you cannot distinguish the two-fold totality between which the exchange hovers, then there is for you no exchange.

Wenn ihr die zwiefache Totalität nicht unterscheiden könnt, zwischen welcher der Wechsel schwebt, so ist für euch kein Wechsel. (Foundation 116)

This is the first mention in the Foundation of hovering, which, as becomes clear in the ensuing section, §4.E.III.2.b.γ, describes the activity of the imagination. The hovering of the imagination describes the attempt to hold on to two contrary commitments at once, which is logically impossible, but in a speculative, idealist way is sometimes what Fichte claims the mind is doing. At the end of the Section, Fichte is indeed going to argue that the state of judging p and the state of withholding judgment, i.e. <p, Not-p> are, in accordance with the ability of the imagination, in some way both simultaneously active in objective knowledge.

Regarding our second term, the “determinability of totality” Fichte says this:

Thus, in order to explain the possibility of the postulated exchange, we assume the determinability of the totality as such [i.e. as we have just described the totality as either A or A + B - ML]; we are assuming that there is something that allows us to distinguish between both totalities; and this determinability is the matter of the exchange, that on which the exchange proceeds, and the sole means by which the exchange is registered.

Mithin wird zum Behuf der Möglichkeit des postulirten Wechsels die Bestimmbarkeit der Totalität, als solcher, vorausgesetzt; es wird vorausgesetzt, dass man beide Totalitäten an irgend etwas unterscheiden könne; und diese Bestimmbarkeit ist die Materie des Wechsels, dasjenige, woran der Wechsel fortläuft, und wodurch einzig und allein er fixirt wird. (Foundation 116)

As is consistent with Fichte’s general notion in the Foundation of matter as referring to meaning, Fichte is arguing here that the exchange between p and <p, ~p> is only possible because we can distinguish between these two states, because we know when we are judging versus when we are suspending judgment. This point is akin to Kant’s notion of the “I think” that must accompany all my thoughts. The Kantian idea is that every judgment ‘p’ can spontaneously be expanded to recognize the fact that it is I who is thinking it. In this case, Fichte is saying that, when asked, I can always identify what kind of a stance I am taking with regard to p. The totality is “determinable” because when asked about p, we can always say whether we judge p, judge ~p, have no opinion regarding p, are trying to figure what is the case is regarding p, etc. We always can identify when and what we are judging and when we are not making a judgment, and this means that the “totality”, the total space of possibility with regards to a possible judgment p is “determinable.”

Fichte’s piece of iron according to the matter of the exchange

In Fichte’s example of the matter of the exchange involving the piece of iron, we find a number of things made the explicit that we claimed were implicit in the example as it was used to characterize form, namely:

the distinction between essential and accidental properties
the distiction between direct perception, on the one hand, and conceptually determining, or building a mental model of, reality, on the other hand.

Fichte writes (note that I am taking some liberty with the translation here so as to add clarity):

Let us consider a piece of iron as it is understood from common experience and without any expert knowledge about natural science. Let us also consider that piece of iron by itself, meaning isolated, and without any noticable connection to something apart from itself. When you posit that piece of iron as, among other things, resting in place, then movement does not belong to your concept of the iron. If the iron appears to you to be moving forward, then you are entirely correct to connect this movement to something separate from the iron. However, if you instead attribute movement to the iron, which is also correct, there that concept [of iron] is no longer complete, und you must, in this respect, further determine it [i.e. the concept of iron], by, for example, putting magnetic attraction within its scope. – That makes a difference. If you take as a starting point the first concept [of iron], then being at rest is essential to the piece of iron, and only movement is for the iron accidental; if, however, you take the second concept as a starting point, then both being at rest and being in motion are accidental; for the first [i.e. being at rest] applies under the condition that a magnet is absent in exactly the same way as the second [i.e. being in motion] applies under the condition that a magnet is present.

(Wenn ihr das Eisen, etwa so wie es durch die gemeine Erfahrung ohne gelehrte Kenntniss der Naturlehre gegeben ist, an sich, d.h. isolirt, und ausser aller euch bemerkbaren Verbindung mit etwas ausser demselben, unter anderen auch als beharrlich an seinem Orte setzt, so gehört die Bewegung nicht in den Begriff desselben, und ihr habt, wenn es euch in der Erscheinung als sich fortbewegend gegeben wird, ganz recht, wenn ihr diese Bewegung auf etwas ausser demselben bezieht. Aber wenn ihr denn doch die Bewegung dem Eisen zuschreibt, worin ihr gleichfalls recht habt, so ist jener Begriff nicht mehr vollständig, und ihr habt in dieser Rücksicht ihn weiter zu bestimmen, und z.B. die Anziehbarkeit durch den Magnet in seinen Umfang zu setzen. – Das macht einen Unterschied. Wenn ihr von dem ersten Begriffe ausgeht, so ist die Beharrlichkeit am Orte dem Eisen wesentlich, und nur die Bewegung in ihm ist zufällig; geht ihr aber von dem zweiten Begriff aus, so ist die Beharrlichkeit sowohl zufällig, als die Bewegung; denn die erstere steht gerade so unter der Bedingung der Abwesenheit, als die letztere unter der Bedingung der Anwesenheit eines Magnets.(Foundation 116-117)

Ficht wants us to see the difference in the two mental models that we might have for explaining our observationn that the piece of iron is in motion. In the first scenario, we know nothing about magnetism, and so, when we see the iron moving, we attribute that motion to some unseen external mechanical force acting on it, that is pushing or pulling the iron. In the second scenario, we know about magnetism, and so we now know that the iron might be moving due to a mechanical or a magnetic force. This can be expressed in terms of judgment and suspended judgment like so: in the first case, if we judge that no mechanical force is acting on the iron, then we judge (falsely in this case) that the iron must be at rest. In the second case, if we judge that no mechanical force is acting on the iron, then we still do not have enough information to say whether or not the iron is moving. Formulated like this, we can see that Fichte is dealing with the following question: when is our knowledge of the world sufficient for us to explain why things are thus and so? In the first case, in which we are ignorant of magnetism, we lack the warrant to properly explain the activity of the iron. In the second case, we are in a position to correctly explain the activity. The question is: does this formulation of the problem extend to simple assertoric judgments, i.e. judgments of the form “the magnet is in motion” and “the magnet is at rest”. For these types of judgments, it maybe seem, appeal directly to perception, and not to a mental model of the world. As we will see at the end of the synthesis, however, Fichte appears to argue that, in fact, apparently simple judgments of perception are themselves a mental modal, an explanation, a conceptual determination, of what they perceive. Judgments of perception, just like predictive judgments of whether we expect a piece of iron to be at rest or in motion, entail commitments to subsequent, related judgments and criteria for their truth or falsity.

Part II: The incorrect hypotheses: “Form determines Matter” and “Matter determines Form”

The next phase of the Section consists in entertaining two false hypotheses, so as to help us, in the final step, zero in on the correct account.

Unfortunately, I don’t find Fichte’s notion of “determination” consistent here as it relates to the notions of form ‘determining’ matter and matter ‘determining’ form. He uses this formula of determination no less than four times in the Theoretical Part, and I have yet to find a characterization that fits all of these cases.⁴ Nevertheless, we can formulate what he means in this particular synthesis when he says that “form determines matter” or “matter determines form”. The “form of the exchange”, we will recall, describes a relation between two states, judging p and suspending judgment of p, where that relationship is one of being contraries. When we are asserting that two things are contrary, we are not asserting that one or the other is the case, but rather, simply, that if one is the case, then the other is not case. “Form determines matters” makes the claim that this is all we can, in fact, say. That we never know whether it is correct to judge p or suspend judgment regarding p. Rather, the only thing we know is that, if we are doing one, we are not doing the other. The alternative hypothesis of “matter determines form” states that we always know when we are entitled to judge p versus when we must suspend judgment regarding p. We can thus explain Fichte’s terminology of ‘determination’ as follows: “form determines matters” says something like “The formal characteristics of the exchange (that the two states are contraries, that we cannot be in both states at the same time) dominates to the extent that we loose site of the material characteristics of the exchange (namely what each state means and whether we are in one or the other). And “matter determines form” says something like: “We are unconcerned with the connection between the states of judging and suspending judgment (that would be the ‘form of the exchange’). We are simply concerned with whatever state we happen to be in, be that judging or suspending judgment.”

Before getting into the details of these hypotheses, it will serve as orientation to consider the following three, unrelated judgments, placing them in the context of what Fichte is saying about what he calls the “totality” of judgment. Each of the three judgments fits into a different category and has a different relationship to Fichte’s proposed “totalities” of judgment:

(a) For any proposition p, “p ∧ ~p” is false.
(b) The piece of iron is stationary.
(c) The ghost is moving.
(a) states a logical truth. It is true unconditionally. There is no scenario under which it is not true. Using Fichte’s notion of an exchange between p and <p, Not-p>, we can say that (a) does not, cannot enter into this exchange. The judgment (a) is an “absolute totality”. (a) excludes ~(a) utterly and completely. We are never in a position in which we would be justified in suspending judgment about whether or not (a) is true.
(b) states an empirical fact about the objective world. We might have sufficient grounds to judge (b), or we might not have sufficient grounds for judging (b). It depends on the state of affairs in the world and our knowledge of them. This is the category of judgment that Fichte’s “exchange of substantiality” is concerned with. He wants to offer some insight concerning when we are entitled to judge (b) and when we are not entitled to do so.
(c) makes an unverifiable claim. There are no ghosts in the objective world and no way to decide between (c) and ~(c). As in the case of (a), there is no exchange between two “totalities”, but only one “totality”, namely an “undetermined…sphere”. We must forever suspend judgment about (c), as we will never be in a position to know whether it is or is not the case.

These different categories of judgment will help us to parse Fichte’s two hypohtesis.

Hypothesis 1: “Form determines matter”

This hypotheses characterizes a skeptical stance toward objective knowledge. It says that there is no objective measure according to which we can know if our judgments are warranted or not. The only thing we can know is when we are making a judgment and when we are not making a judgment. The question, however, of why we are entitled or not entitled to do so, is unavailable to us.

Here is Fichte’s description of this:

If B is excluded by the absolutely posited A, then A is, in this respect, totality; and if we reflect on B, and thus view A not as totality, then A + B, which is itself undetermined, is, in this respect, the determinable totality. The determined or the determinable is totality, depending how one looks at it.

Wird durch das schlechthin gesetzte A ausgeschlossen B, so ist insofern A Totalität; und wird auf B reflectirt, und demnach A nicht als Totalität betrachtet, so ist insofern A + B, das an sich unbestimmt ist, die bestimmbare Totalität. Bestimmtes oder bestimmbares ist Totalität, nachdem man es nun nimmt. (Foundation 117)

The first sentence of this passage is simply a recapitulation of the definiton of the exchange: either we judge A, or are uncertain as to whether A or B. The second sentence then expresses our inability to know which state is warranted: both the state of judging and suspending judgment “are totality, depending how one looks at it.” Fichte elaborates on this point:

…before we were at least hopeful that we could find a ground of determination. This hope is, however, completed dashed by the current result. The meaning of this result is negative and says to us: there is no ground of determination possible that is possible except for the relative ground of determination.

…vorher hatten wir doch Hoffnung, irgend einen Bestimmungsgrund zu finden. Durch das gegenwärtige Resultat aber wird diese Hoffnung völlig abgeschnitten; seine Bedeutung ist negativ, und es sagt uns: es ist überhaupt gar kein Bestimmungsgrund möglich, als durch Relation. (Foundation 117-118)

Fichte’s “ground of determination” would be some measure according to which we would either know our judgment to be correct, or know that we lack the sufficient ground to make a judgment. Something like that does exist for certain kinds of judgments. For example, purely logical judgments contain within themselves a sufficient grounding of their correctness. The logical statement above outlining the law of non-contradiction (‘For any proposition p, “p ∧ ~p” is false.’) excludes is contradiction always, and we always have sufficient resources to be certain of that, because the dictates of logic give us those resources. Take as another example the judgment that a ghost is moving. Here, too, we have sufficient grounds for knowing that we can never make this judgment, since it makes neither a logical claim, nor a claim that can be verified by empirical observation.

Fichte’s hypotheses becomes interesting in relation to judgments concerning the objective world, for example, the judgment “The piece of iron is at rest.” What would be our “ground of determination” that allows us to either be certain that some piece of iron in some room is moving or not? According to the current hypothesis, we can have no certainty in this regard.

At this point, it is helpful to divide the scenario of the piece of iron into two parts. In the one case, we would justify our judgment that the iron is at rest with an appeal to direct perception - “I see the piece of iron is at rest”. In another consideration, we would justify our judgment that the iron is at rest without an appeal to direct perception, and rather with a conceptual explanation: “The iron must be a rest beacuse nothing is moving it, and there is no magnetic field in the area.” I believe Fichte makes the argument at the end of the syntheses that both types of explanations - explanations appealing to direct perception and explanations appealing to concepts, involve judgments and inferences, so that both scenarios end up using the same logic of judgment. The perceptual explanation “I see the piece of iron is at rest” can, for example, also be challenged and meet this challenge with further reasons, such as “I have my eye continually on the piece of iron, and during this time, I detect no movement.” In the continuing example Fichte gives of the piece of iron, he, for now only considers what I have termed conceptual explanation:

(In the previous example, one can assume the absolutely posited concept of the iron, in which case being at rest is an essential property of the piece of iron; or one can assume the determinable concept of the piece of iron, and then being at rest is an accidental property. Both explanations are correct, depending on how one looks at it, and there is no determining rule that helps us one way or the other. The difference is merely relative.)

(Im vorigen Beispiel kann man von dem schlechthin gesetzten Begriffe des Eisens ausgehen, so ist die Beharrlichkeit am Orte dem Eisen wesentlich; oder von dem bestimmbaren Begriffe desselben, so ist sie ein Accidens. Beides ist recht, je nachdem man es nimmt, und es lässt hierüber sich gar keine bestimmende Regel geben. Der Unterschied ist lediglich relativ.) (Foundation 118)

Fichte’s example, as he describes it earlier, shows that there does turn out to be a way to decide between these two conceptions of our piece of iron - one as a non-magnetic, the other as magnetic. The first conception of the piece of iron that contained no concept of magnetism breaks down at some point. It gets rejected by the evidence. However, at a certain moment in time, before we see the iron moving, we have no way to know whether or not the iron is magnetic. This generalizes to all of our understanding of the objective world. In the face of sufficient evidence, any part of our understanding of the world can turn out to be incorrect.

Hypothesis 2: “Matter determines form”

Whereas the former hypothesis entertained skepticism, this hypothesis entertains dogmatism. It entertains the idea that our knowledge of the objective world could be true without qualification. In terms of the exchange Fichte is describing, we would always be correct in either judging p, or determining that we lack sufficient grounds for judging p.

Fichte writes:

The matter of the exchange determines its form would mean: the determinability of the totality, in the sense explained, which is accordingly posited because something else is supposed to determine it [i.e. determine the totality] (i.e. it is really possible to make a determination [i.e. to determine the totality], and there exists some X according to which it happens and which we are not concerned with seeking out here), that determinability of totality determines the mutual exclusion.

Die Materie des Wechsels bestimmt seine Form, würde heissen: die Bestimmbarkeit der Totalität, im erklärten Sinne, die demnach gesetzt ist, da sie etwas anderes bestimmen soll (d. i. die Bestimmung ist wirklich möglich, und es giebt irgend ein X, nach welchem sie geschieht, mit dessen Aufsuchung wir es aber hier nicht zu thun haben), bestimmt das gegenseitige Ausschließen. (Foundation 118)

Fichte is following here his standard formula. The “form of the exchange” is the “mutual exclusion” of judging versus withholding judgment. The “matter of the exchange” he calls the “determinability of the totality”, and the sentence quoted above says that matter determines form. As we saw above, the “determinability of the totality” refers to the difference in meaning between judging p and withholding judgment on p. It refers to our ability to distinguish these two states, to understand that they both say something different about the “totality”, something different about what we think regarding p. It is interesting to note that in his gloss of this formulaic term, Fichte inlcudes the thought that we can not only distinguish the two states, but that there is some mechansim by which we know which one of the two states to apply in a given situation. In Fichte’s terms: there is some “X” according to which we “determine” the “totality”, which is to say, according to which we either judge or withhold judgment. In his initial characterization of the “matter of the exchange” Fichte had a similar but noticably different formulation:

If you cannot distinguish between the two-fold totality between which the exchange hovers, there then is for you no exchange. You cannot distinguish it [i.e. the two-fold totality], if there isn’t some kind of X by which you can orient yourselves, an X situated outside of both [totalities], i.e. outside of both considered only as totality.

Wenn ihr die zwiefache Totalität nicht unterscheiden könnt, zwischen welcher der Wechsel schwebt, so ist für euch kein Wechsel. Ihr könnt sie aber nicht unterscheiden, wenn nicht ausser beiden, insofern sie nichts als Totalität sind, irgend ein X liegt, nach welchem ihr euch orientirt. (Foundation 116)

In this first description of matter, Fichte was concerned with our ability to “distinguish” (unterscheiden) the two totalities, to “orient” outselves with respect to their difference. In the gloss he gives now, in the hypothesis of matter determining form, matter now refers to our ability to not just distinguish p from <p, ~p>, but to determine whether p or <p, ~p> is correct: “the determination is really possible, and there is some kind of X, according to which it happens”. The thought connecting these two differing formulations is this: our ability to distinguish between two things is intimately connected with our ability to know when each of the two things is warranted.

Fichte’s next move is to offer a gloss of what it means to claim that “matter determines form”:

One of both, either the determined, or the determinable is absolute totality, and the other is then not [absolute totality]; and thus there is something that is absolutely excluded, something that is excluded by that totality [i.e. by the absolute totality]. For example, if the determined is absolute totality, then that which is thereby excluded is absolutely excluded. Thus - this is the result of the current synthesis - there exists an absolute ground of the totality, and the totality is not merely relative.

Eins von beiden, entweder das bestimmte, oder das bestimmbare, ist absolute Totalität, und das andere ist es dann nicht; und es giebt daher auch ein absolutes Ausgeschlossene, dasjenige, welches durch jene Totalität ausgeschlossen wird. Ist z.B. das bestimmte – absolute Totalität, so ist das dadurch ausgeschlossene das absolut ausgeschlossene. – Also – das ist das Resultat der gegenwärtigen Synthesis – es giebt einen absoluten Grund der Totalität, und dieselbe ist nicht lediglich relativ. (Foundation 118)

The hypothesis Fichte entertains here is that we are always correct in our judgment p or in our need to withhold judgment. Given the information we have at any one time, we can know with certainty which state we are warranted to be in. This hypotheses captures something about the decisiveness with which we judge that things are thus and so. When we determine that the iron is in motion, we don’t do so half way, but rather stake the claim completely, don’t stand down when questioned, are prepared to defend it, etc.⁵ The dogmatic hypothesis, however, exaggerates this decisiveness with which we judge. For even when we judge p, we are prepared, upon sufficient evidence to relinquish that position. In this hypothesis, however, when judging p, ~p is not just “excluded” but “absolutely excluded”. There is no possible misfire of judgment, no possible correct of judgment since judgment is always correct.

We can develop an intuition for what Fichte means here about judgment “absolutely” excluding its suspension, and visa versa by considering again the three example judgments offered above. The logical judgment “For any proposition p, “p ∧ ~p” is false.” does indeed “absolutely” exclude the contradictory judgment. The judgment is self-sufficient. There is no further perspective from which it might turn out that it is not true. Something similar can be said of the judgment “The ghost is moving.” Once we acknowledge that the “ghost” has no referent in the empirical world, we recognize that we can never determine whether it is true or not. We thereby “absolutely” exclude the possibility that we could ever make such a judgment. In both of these cases, we identify the judgments as certain types of judgments, i.e. judgments that are absolutely true or judgments that lack any real world correlate and are thus fundamentally undecidable. Fichte’s current hypothesis entertains the idea that judgments of objectivity might also reveal themselves to be true without qualification, or undecidable without qualification. Under such a model, judgments would never err.

Here is another gloss that Fichte gives later of this hypothesis:

One must assume one of the two [totalities, i.e. p or <p, ~p>], and there must be a rule for this. What, however, the rule is, had to remain undecided, because determinability and not determination is supposed to be the ground of determining that which is excluded.

es ist eine von beiden [Totalitäten, i.e. p oder <p, ~p>] anzunehmen, und es muß darüber eine Regel geben. Welches aber diese Regel sei, mußte natürlich unentschieden bleiben, weil Bestimmbarkeit, nicht aber Bestimmung, der Bestimmungsgrund des Auszuschließenden sein sollte. (Foundation 119)

This description of the hypothesis shows the limits of our analogy between what Fichte is proposing and our description of logical or fanciful judgments as “absolutely” excluding their decidability or undecidability, respectively. Our example of logical and fanciful judgments describe just such a “rule” by which they can be “determined”. But as Fichte makes clear here, according to this hypotheses there is no way to formulate such a rule that is external to the circumstances of the judgment, external to the judgment itself and that which it judges: “What…the rule is [has] to remain undecided.” This can only mean that the absolute determination of whether one must judge or withhold judgment must happen in the moment at the moment of the considered judgment. We cannot “determine” the judgment, i.e. subsume the judgment under a type (logical, emprical, or fanciful) and thereby “absolutely exclude” either p or <p, ~p>: “determinability and not determination is the ground of determining that which is excluded.” To say that “determinability” must be the ground of exclusion is to say that the judgment must by itself make transparent to the person judging whether or not it is warranted. Fichte is identifying here something special about judgment - that it contains its own measure of correctness.⁶ And it is particular to objective judgment that its correctness relates to what is, objectivity, the case (in contrast to, for example logical judgments, which have logical principles as their measure of correctness). This means that one cannot determine a priori whether a judgment is warranted or not, but only in combination with the facts that are so judged. The current hypotheses attempts to attribute a self-sufficiently characteristic of logical judgemnts to objective judgments. Objective judgments, however, are not self-sufficient, but rather depend upon the objective state of affairs, and this dependence on the objective state of fairs introduces a source of error in judgment that does not exist in logical judgment and that precludes any possibility that a judgment could “absolutely” exclude the possibility that it is incorrect.

Part III: The interdetermination of form and matter

A general sketch

Fichte’s standard procedure in the various “syntheses” of the Foundation is to, after considering the two hypotheses that 1) form determines matter and 2) matter determine form, argue that form and matter determine one another (“sich gegenseitig bestimmen”). This is the point at which we have now arrived. Fichte marks this point in the argument with his italicized claim:

Neither of the two should determine the other; rather, both sould determine one another…

Keins von beiden soll das andere, sondern beide sollen sich gegenseitig bestimmen… (Foundation 118)

Based on the rule of synthesis, we would expect that the “two” things that Fichte is referring to are form and matter, and that we are about to read an account of how form and matter mutually determine one another. However, Fichte does something different here that breaks with his synthesis schema. He argues not for an interdetermination of form and matter, but rather for an interdetermination of the two opposing states, judging p and withholding judgment of p, the two states that together, through their competing claims, composed the “form” and “matter” of the exchange. We can see this in Fichte’s characterization of the “interdetermination” he wants to argue for:

The absolute totality should not be A, and also not A + B, but rather A determined by A + B. The determinable should be determined by the determinate, the determinate by the determinable; and the unity that arises here is the totality that we are looking for.

Nicht A soll die absolute Totalität seyn, auch nicht A + B, sondern A bestimmt durch A + B. Das bestimmbare soll durch das bestimmte, das bestimmte soll durch das bestimmbare bestimmt werden; und die hieraus entstehende Einheit ist die Totalität, welche wir suchen. (Foundation 119)

In other words, judgment (here: A) and suspension of judgment (here: A + B) form, in some way, a “unity”. There is some way in which objective reality is consitituted through the simultaneity of judging and suspending judgment. This claim is, on the face of it, a direct contradiction of the definition of form, which said that judging and suspending judgment are two contrary states: one cannot do both at the same time. Fichte’s interdetermination argument seeks to find a conception of simultaneity that leaves room for the “form of the exchange” as it was defined thus far, namely the “mutual exclusion” of judgment and the suspension of judgment. Our close examination of this passage will show that this is possible if we think of the suspension of judgment as on its way toward judgment, that is as aiming toward judgment. The general idea here is that every judgment is both final and not final. If, in one moment, we judge p, then, in the next, we reevaluate whether, in fact, the evidence speaks for p or against it. The maintaining of the judgment p involves the constant reevaluation of the evidence for and against p. We can hold onto both the contradiction and simultaneity of judgment and its suspension by arguing that, although in one moment we can only do one or the other, in any extended amount of the time we do both. Judging p and suspending judgment of p are two states that, in the maintainence of consciousness, in the maintainance of objectivity percieved, occur side by side. This is the argument, for example, adumbrated by Fichte’s description of the imagination at the conclusion of his argument:

The positing Self, by means of its most wonderful capacity…holds onto the disappearing accident long enough to compare it with that which replaces it.

Das setzende Ich, durch das wunderbarste seiner Vermögen…hält das schwindende Accidenz so lange fest, bis es dasjenige, wodurch dasselbe verdrängt wird, damit verglichen hat. (Foundation 124)

The basic thought expressed in this sentence is that our judgment p only holds so long as we can maintain that judgment, and maintaining that judgment p means reaffirming or rejecting it in the face of ongoing evidence. This other eivdence would be, for example, the contrary judgment q, the “accident” that “replaces” the previous accident in the sentence quoted above. The flow of consciousness consists in the maintainance or rejection of a judgment p. This carrying over, or not, of a judgment p from one moment to the next, presupposes a moment in between the two moments of judgment in which judgment is suspended and the evidence for both sides of that judgment are evaluated.

This is a sketch of Fichte’s argument that we are going to examine in more detail when we go through the text more slowly. Fichte argument for “interdetermination” seeks to redefine the contrary nature of judgment and suspended judgment as not mere contraries, but contraries that are always in contact with one another. Because we can follow Fichte’s argument closely throughout this part of the Section, we need not be too concerned with the fact that Fichte seems to depart from his schema of “interdetermination” applying to “form” and “matter”. Furthermore, on the level of general argumentation, Fichte’s final argument does follow the general pattern of seeking a middle path between the two incorrect hypotheses that precede it. We will remember that the hypotheses of form determining matter and matter determining form formulated the skeptical and dogmatic theories of judgment, respectively. These two theories form the guardrails, so to speak, between which a correct theory of objective judgment must operate. Skepticism argued for the purely relative nature of judgment, that one could always judge or not judge, and there is no way to know when one is warranted to judge or not. Dogmaticism, on the other hand, left no room for judgment to self-correct, because it allowed no room for judgment to misfire. The middle path lies in articulating a conception of judgment in which judgment is fallible, but not hopelessly so, in which judgment can misfire, but nevertheless moves toward, aims for reliable knowledge.

Fichte’s argument for the interdetermination of judgment and judgment’s suspension, this middle path between skepticism and dogmatism, brings the synthesis of subsantiality directly to bear on the problem that Part II, the Theoretical Part of the Foundation, is trying to solve. Of course, the other syntheses of §4.E are all working toward solving the problem, but this synthesis does so in a manner that is more direct than any of the other syntheses that preceed it. The principle which the Theoretical Part of the Foundation is supposed to explain is this:

The Self posits itself as determined by the Not-Self.

das Ich setzt sich, als bestimmt durch das Nicht-Ich. (Foundation 48)

Explaining this principle means explaining how the Self can be both active - it “posits itself as…” - and passive - it is “determined by the Not-Self” - at one and the same time. In our current syntheses, we are similarly concerned with the syntheses of opposites - judgment and the suspension of judgment. Judging p takes the place here of the Self “positing itself”. If we add something to our understanding of suspended judgment, then we can also see that suspended judgment characterizes the passivity of being “determined by the Not-Self.” The idea here is that suspended judgment doesn’t simply rest in the state of not knowing. Rather, suspended judgment aims toward judgment. Suspended judgment is a judgment that is incomplete. The way that suspended judgment aims toward judgment is in turning to appearances, in gathering perceptual evidence and perhaps its attendant conceptual evidence that can be used in the next judgment. This is indeed how Fichte at one point describes the example with the piece of iron. We “posit” the piece of iron as stationary, but then the iron “appears to us as moving”, literally “is given to us in appearance as moving itself forward” (“wenn es sich in der Erscheinung als sich fortbewegend gegeben wird”) (Foundation 116). On the one hand, we determined that the iron is not, could not, be moving. However, we gathered new perceptual evidence that contradicted this determination and led to a new determination, namely that the iron is in motion. This is only possible if, after having determined the iron to be at rest, we turn toward the iron and gather new perceptual information regarding whether that is actually the case. Of course, this perceptual information can itself be thought of as composed of judgments, for example, in the judgment that something in my visual field is moving, and that something in fact belongs to the piece of iron, so that it is the iron itself that is moving.⁷ The general point is that, while the act of judgment represents a turning away, an abstraction, from the richness of evidence, a determination, based on the evidence, of what is that case, the suspension of judgment is a (re)evaluation of the evidence, a turning toward, a focus on the thing that we have just determined to be thus and so. In making a judgment, we declare our ability to know that things are thus as so, and this means focusing our mind not on the evidence that supports that judgment, but on the judgment itself. And in that sense, judgment is a turning away from appearances in which we emancipate ourselves from the dictates of appearance, extricate ourselfs from the saturated phenomena, and instead commit to judgment alone, similar to how, when a judge makes a ruling, the case is laid ad acta. The suspension of judgment, in contrast, entails a renewed interest in the evidence, a closer examining of the circumstances leading to or away from the judgment considered. This suspension of judgment is what Fichte describes as the activity of the imagination, as the act of “hovering” between possibilities, looking to make a judgment, but not yet convinced by the evidence. The suspension of judgment is the moment in which “the Self…holds onto the disappearing accident long enough to compare it with that which replaces it.” (Foundation 124) The aim of the synthesis of judgment and its suspension is thus to show how the act and its suspension are intimately related, and how the suspension of judgment is the kind of passive moment for which the Theoretical Part of the Foundation is ultimately searching, a passive moment that is only intelligible in terms of the activity of judgment of which it, itself, is a moment.

The outline of the final synthesis

The final synthesis can be roughly divided into four parts:

A formuliac description of what, thus far has been considered, i.e. the false hypotheses of skepticism and dogmatism, and what will now be argued for.
A description of the new synthesis as an interdetermination of “A” and “A+B”
A new consideration implied by the new synthesis, namley that “B”, considered in isolation, is also part of the interdetermination of “A” and “A+B”. This section includes a concluding note, “for those who are not in a position to draw such an easy conclusion themselves” (Foundation 123). This note offers, among other things, a characterizaton of imagination, and the claim that every accident is “the carrier of itself and its opposite”.

The formula of interdetermination

Contrary to what will actually occur, Fichte’s first characterization of indetermination does, in fact, argue for an interdetermination of form and matter:

the absolute and relative ground of determining the totality should be one and the same; the relation should be absolute, and the absolute should be nothing other than a relation.

absoluter und relativer Grund der Totalitätsbestimmung sollen Eins und ebendasselbe sein; die Relation soll absolut, und das Absolute soll nichts weiter sein, als eine Relation. (Foundation 118-119)

Fichte developes the contrasting terms “absolute” and “relative” in the previous hypotheses of unidirectional determination. The skeptical hypothesis argued that “no ground of determination is at all possible, except by means of a relation.” The example of the magnet showed that the two different ways for explaining the movement of the magnet were “merely relative.” The dogmatic hypothesis, on the other hand, argued for an “absolute ground of totality” and against the notion of a “merely relative” totality. The argument for the unity of “the absolute” and “the relative” ought to consist in a new consideration of how the matter - the claim of judgment or suspended judgment - and the form - the contrariness of judgment and suspended judgment - are related. As will become clear, this is only possible by reconsidering the notions of form and matter as they were thus far defined.

Fichte continues:

Let us attempt to clarify this most important result. - When the totality is determined, that which is excluded is also determined, and visa versa: that is also a relation, but there is no question about it. The question is: which of the two possible kinds of determination should assume and settle on?

Wir suchen dieses höchst wichtige Resultat deutlich zu machen. Durch die Bestimmung der Totalität wird zugleich das ausschliessende bestimmt, und umgekehrt: das ist auch eine Relation, aber über sie ist keine Frage. Die Frage ist, welche von beiden möglichen Bestimmungsarten ist anzunehmen und festzusetzen? (Foundation 119)

The two “kinds of determination” (Bestimmungsarten) that Fichte has in mind are judgment - or “A” as a “determined totality” and suspended judgment - or “A+B” as the “undetermined but determinable totality”. “Determing the totality” refers to chosing one of the these “kinds of determination” as the “totality”, and therefore excluding the other: “When the totality is determined, that which is excluded is also determined, and visa versa.” The structure of “exclusion” whereby we select one “kind of determination” and thereby exclude the other, is what Fichte has thus far called the “form of the exchange” of substantiality.

Now comes a characterization of the skeptical and dogmatic hypotheses, respectively. First skepticism:

In the first instance, we answered: neither of the two [kinds of determination]; there is no determined rule here besides the following: if one assumes the one [kind of determination, i.e. judging or suspending judgment], then one thereby cannot assume the other, and visa versa; we are not, however, in a position to decide which of the two one should assume. (Foundation 119)

Hierauf wurde im ersten Gliede geantwortet: keine von beiden; es giebt hierbei gar keine bestimmte Regel, als die: nimmt man die eine an, so kann man insofern die andere nicht annehmen, und umgekehrt; welche von beiden aber man annehmen solle, darüber lässt sich nichts festsetzen.

Second, dogmatism:

In the second instance we answered: we can assume one of the two [kinds of determination], and there must be a rule for this. What, however, the rule is, must of course remaim undecided, because determinability and not determination ought to be the ground of determining what should be excluded.

Im zweiten Gliede wurde geantwortet: es ist eine von beiden anzunehmen, und es muss darüber eine Regel geben. Welches aber diese Regel sey, musste natürlich unentschieden bleiben, weil Bestimmbarkeit, nicht aber Bestimmung, der Bestimmungsgrund des auszuschliessenden seyn sollte. (Foundation 119)

Now comes Fichte’s claim for the interdetermination, and not strictly contradiction of judging and suspending judgment, the two “kinds of determination” (Bestimmungsarten) that he identified in the preceding paragraph:

Both propositions [i.e. the skeptical and the dogmatic propositions] are unified by the current proposition; the proposition therefore claims: there is, indeed, a rule, but not a rule that establishes one of the two kinds of determination; rather, the rule establishes both kinds of determination as mutually to be determined, one by means of the other. – Neither of the two that we have examined thus far as kinds of determination is the totality we are looking for; rather, only both, as mutually determined, one by means of the other, constitute this totality.

Beide Sätze werden durch den gegenwärtigen vereinigt; es wird demnach durch ihn behauptet: es sey allerdings eine Regel, aber nicht eine solche, die eine von beiden Bestimmungsarten, sondern die beide, als gegenseitig durcheinander zu bestimmend, aufstelle. – Keine einzelne von den bis jetzt als solche betrachteten ist die gesuchte Totalität, sondern beide gegenseitig durcheinander bestimmt machen erst diese Totalität. (Foundation 119)

Fichte’s investigation began with the definition of totality as either “A” or “A+B”, either judging or suspending judgment, and now he is proposing that precisely this alternative, this either/or in how we understand totality is, in some sense, incorrect. The challange going forward will be to find a way in which we manage to hold on to the original claim that judgment and suspending judgment exclude one another, while also making room for the new claim that these two states do coexist, and not sometimes and accidentally so, but rather always and essentially.

The interdetermination of “A” and “A+B”

Here is Fichte’s description of the new “totality”, the new knd of unity, composed of a contradiction, that he is proposing:

Thus we are talking about – a relation of both kinds of determination, the kind of determination by means of relation and the absolute kind of determination; and by means of this relation we can first establish the totality we have been looking for. The absolute totality should not be A, and also not A + B, but rather A determined by A + B. The determinable should be determined by the determinate, the determinate by the determinable; and the unity that arises here is the totality that we are looking for.

Also – von einer Relation beider Bestimmungsarten, der durch Relation, und der absoluten, ist die Rede; und durch diese Relation wird erst die gesuchte Totalität aufgestellt. Nicht A soll die absolute Totalität seyn, auch nicht A + B, sondern A bestimmt durch A + B. Das bestimmbare soll durch das bestimmte, das bestimmte soll durch das bestimmbare bestimmt werden; und die hieraus entstehende Einheit ist die Totalität, welche wir suchen. (Foundation 119)

We can collect Fichte’s different, but equivalent terminology for the two “sides of the exchange” (Wechselglieder) in a table:


A	A + B
the determinate (das Bestimmte)	the determinable (das Bestimmbare)
absolute determination (die Bestimmungsart durch Relation)	relative determination (die absolute Bestimmungsart)
unconditional positing (unbedingtes Setzen)	conditional positing (bedingtes Setzen)

In the next paragraphs, Fichte explains how we are to understand the new “totality” that arises from the interdetermination of the “determinate” and the “determinable”.

The determinate and the determinable should mutually determine one another evidently means: the determination of that which is to be determined consist precisely in the fact that it is a determinable. It is a determinable and nothing else; that is its entire being. – This determinability is now the totality we have be looking for, i.e. the determinability is a determinate quantum which has its limits, and beyond which no further determination occurs; and all possible determinability lies within these limits.

Das bestimmte und das bestimmbare sollen sich gegenseitig bestimmen, heisst offenbar: die Bestimmung des zu bestimmenden besteht eben darin, dass es ein bestimmbares sey. Es ist ein bestimmbares, und weiter nichts; darin besteht sein ganzes Wesen. – Diese Bestimmbarkeit nun ist die gesuchte Totalität, d.h. die Bestimmbarkeit ist ein bestimmtes Quantum, sie hat ihre Grenzen, über welche hinaus keine Bestimmung weiter statt findet; und innerhalb dieser Grenzen liegt alle mögliche Bestimmbarkeit. (Foundation 124)

The strategy of arguing for the interdetermination of p and <p, ~p> consists in pointing out how each side of the contradiction contains characteristics of the other side, so that we can deduce <p, ~p> from p, and visa versa. We go from the determinate, p, to the determinable by pointing out that p could be false; even though I assert p, even though I might be very certain of p, I nevertheless recognize p as being a truth-bearer, i.e. as conceivably false. The judgment p is a truth bearer; its “determination consists in the fact that it is determinable”, i.e. it can be true or false, meaning that either p and ~p is the case. In the other direction, we recognize that A + B, or <p, ~p>, is a limitation of all possibilities to just two, namely, A and B, or p and ~p, and, as such, it marks a determination, albeit not to p and p alone, but rather to p or ~p: “the determinability is a determinate quantum which has its limits, and beyond which no further determination occurs”. This limit of the determinable <p, ~p> can be described as consisting of two elements, p and ~p, or just simply p, insofar as p is a truth bearer. At the conclusion of this section, Fichte will apply a shorter formula for this unity of p and its contradction ~p with the argument that “the one accident is always the carrier of itself and its opposite” (das eine Akzidens ist jedesmal sein eigener und des entgegengesetzten Akzidens Träger) (Foundation 124).

Fichte’s next step is to generalize from a specific judgment to the sum of all judgments as constitutive of objectivity. He begins with the idea that objectivity is the sum total of a subject’s judgments:

Let us apply this result to the current case, and everything will be immediately clear. – The Self posits itself. The absolutely posited reality of the Self consists therein; the sphere of this reality is exhausted, and contains therefore the absolute totality (of the absolutely posited reality of the Self).

Wir wenden dieses Resultat an auf den vorliegenden Fall, und es wird sogleich alles klar seyn. – Das Ich setzt sich. Darin besteht die schlechthin gesetzte Realität desselben; die Sphäre dieser Realität ist erschöpft, und enthält daher absolute Totalität (der schlechthin gesetzten Realität des Ich). (Foundation 120)

The idea here is that the world is whatever I take it to be. When Fichte says here that “the Self posits itself”, he is referring not to some practical activity of asserting oneself in the world, but rather to the “I think” that, in Kant’s terms, must accompany all my thoughts. Here, in the Theoretical Part of the Foundation, to “posit oneself” is to understand reality as that which I take it to be. The judgments which constitute reality belong to the Self, originate in the Self, are judgments issued from and warranted by the Self. In this sense, reality is that which arises when “the Self posits itself”. Reality is the Self’s expression of itself through the medium of judgment.

The solipsism that seems to accompany Fichte’s claim that reality consists of the Self’s self-positing finds its counterbalance in the notion of positing an object:

The Self posits an object. This objective positing must necessarily be excluded from the sphere of the Self’s self-positing. However, this objective positing should be attributed to the Self; and thus we obtain the sphere A + B as (up until now unlimited) totality of the Self’s actions.

Das Ich setzt ein Object. Nothwendig muss dieses objective Setzen ausgeschlossen werden aus der Sphäre des Sich-setzens des Ich. Doch soll dieses objective Setzen dem Ich zugeschrieben werden; und dadurch erhalten wir dann die Sphäre A + B als (bis jetzt unbegrenzte) Totalität der Handlungen des Ich. (Foundation 120)

Fichte divides the “positing” of an object into the two states of judgment and suspended judgment. In general, to “posit an object” means to recognize something external to the judgment p as the source of the judgment’s truth or falsity. Reality is thus not the sum total of the Self’s judgments, but rather the sum total of the Self’s true judgments, and the truth of any judgment p depends on what, objectively, is the case. When I judge p, I assert the truth of p and thereby exclude ~p. In Fichte’s terms, I “exclude” “this objective positing” from my judgments, i.e. “from the sphere of the Self’s self-positing”. In judging p, I assert the valdity of p, which means that I assert my ability to know what is the case. In the moment I judge p, my judgment is self-sufficient, I no longer need to examine “the object”, because I have determined the object to be thus and so. Next comes Fichte’s “doch”, his “however”, which marks the suspension of judgment. In the next moment, I am uncertain about whether p or ~p, and I refer the question of “p or ~p” to the objective realm - I weigh the perceptual and conceptual evidence for and against p. In this state of suspended judgment, the “totality” of my actions are “unlimited” insofar as I resist a limitation to either “p” or “~p”, and instead stand “unlimited” between the two judgments. When my judgment is suspended, I hold onto p and ~p as the “(up until now unlimited) totality of the Self’s actions”.

The next step argues for the interdetermination of judgment and its suspension, or, in the terms he gives here, the interdetermination of the subjective “sphere” of my judgments, and the objective “sphere” consisting of my judgments plus the negation of any and all of my judgments, as the case may be:

According to the current synthesis, both spheres should determined one another: A gives what it has, an absolute limit; A + B gives was it has, content.

Nach der gegenwärtigen Synthesis sollen beide Sphären sich gegenseitig bestimmen: A gibt was es hat, absolute Grenze; A + B gibt, was es hat, Gehalt. (Foundation 120)

“A gives…an absolute limit” refers to the idea that the all of my objective knowledge, in order for it to be knowledge, must by taken up in the form of knowledge. Every piece of objective knowledge must be expressible in the form of a proposition p. “A gives…an absolute limit” because it formulates a proposition, and this form of the proposition is the limit of what can be known. “A + B gives…content” because it gives objective validity to what is claimed, to p or ~p, as the case may be. In the formulation Fichte uses here, a proposition has no “content” (Gehalt) unless it refers to something that actually is the case. It is through the determination of <p, ~p> into a finite proposition p (or ~p as the case may be) that a proposition, which has the “absolute limit” of either p or ~p, attains objectivity validity.

Fichte continues:

And now the Self is positing an object, and then not the subject; or the subject and then not the object, – in so far as it [the Self] posits itself and positing in according to this rule.

Und nun ist das Ich setzend ein Object, und dann nicht das Subject; oder das Subject, und dann nicht ein Object, – insofern es sich setzt, als setzend nach dieser Regel. (Foundation 120)

This again describes the contradiction of judgment and the suspension of judgment. The “subject” stands here for judgment, since a judgment is my judgment. The “object” stands for the suspension of judgment, since the truth or falsity of my judgment depends not on me but on what is objectively the case.

From contradiction, Fichte now moves to unity:

And thus both spheres fall into one another, and fill, only together, a single limited sphere; and in this sense the determination of the Self consists in the determinability by means of the subject and object.

Und so fallen beide Sphären in einander, und füllen erst vereint eine einzige begrenzte Sphäre aus; und insofern besteht die Bestimmung des Ich in der Bestimmbarkeit durch Subject und Object. (Foundation 120)

We can think of the unified sphere of subject and object as consisting of the objectively valid judgment p. The subject provides the form of the judgment, it’s topic “p”, and the object provides the validity or non-validity of p.

Next Fichte gives his definition of substance:

Determined determinability is the totality that we have been searching for, and such a totality is what one calls a substance.

Bestimmte Bestimmbarkeit ist die Totalität, die wir suchten, und eine solche nennt man eine Substanz. (Foundation 120)

The argument of this passage is that every objective judgment is subject to experience - there are no objective judgments that hold absolutely. “Substance” can be thought of here as the totality of experience, and the claim here is that there is no judgment about experience, about “substance”, that holds absolutely. Every judgment - the “determined” part of the “determined determinability” is either true or false, and that is the “determinability” of the “determined.”

Next Fichte introduces the language of “unconditional” and “conditional” positing:

The Self posits itself as: self positing by excluding the Not-Self, or positing the Not-Self by excluding itself. Self positing occurs here twice; but in very different respects. In its first occurence it refers to a unconditional positing, in its second occurence it refers to a conditional positing that is determined by the exclusion of the Not-Self.

Das Ich setzt sich als: sich setzend dadurch, dass es das Nicht-Ich ausschliesst, oder das Nicht-Ich setzend, dadurch, dass es sich ausschliesst. – Sich setzen kommt hier zweimal vor; aber in sehr verschiedener Rücksicht. Durch das erstere wird ein unbedingtes, durch das letztere ein bedingtes und durch ein Ausschliessen des Nicht-Ich bestimmbares Setzen bezeichnet. (Foundation 121)

Unconditional self-positing refers to the “I think” that must accompany all judgment. It is unconditional because any and all judgments, qua judgments, require the “I think”. There is no condition under which the “I think” is not required. On the other hand, conditional self positing refers to the truth content of the judgment. The truth of the judgment “p” is conditional upon the objective state of affairs. In this regard, “self-positing” and “excluding the Not-Self” refers to the Self’s assertion that a judgment is true. One asserts one’s own ability - “self positing” - to know that “p”, and one “excludes the Not-Self” by excluding the possibility of “~p”. In the moment I judge “p”, I know my knowledge to be self-sufficient. I turn away from the particulars of the world that might tell me that ~p is the case. The other alternative is that I ‘posit the Not-Self by excluding myself’. In this instance, “positing the Not-Self” means turning to the world to make a determination about the truth of “p”. “Excluding myself” refers to negating my ability to make a determination about what is the case.

Next Fichte explains “determined determinability”, i.e. the synthesis of “A” and “A+B” in terms of his example of the magnet. As in his previous examples of the magnet, he wants to show us that the judgment of a piece of iron being at rest is subject to experience. It cannot follow, in a purely logical fashion, from principles about iron in general, since principles about iron in general are themselves subject to experience, and this experience may or may not support such principles. Every judgment about the “substance” of experience is negatable, and if a judgment is not negatable, then the judgment is not applicable to experience, but rather only to principles of logical necessity. First Fichte describes the form of the judgment that does not answer to experience:

The determination of the iron in itself is that of being stationary, and the change in location is thereby excluded; and the iron is in this respect not substance, because it is not determinable.

Die Bestimmung des Eisens an sich sey Beharrlichkeit am Orte, so ist die Veränderung des Orts dadurch ausgeschlossen; und das Eisen ist insofern nicht Substanz, denn es ist nicht bestimmbar. (Foundation 121)

Experience then shows that the iron, which was judged to be stationary is, in fact, in motion:

Now the change in location is supposed to be attributed to the iron.

Nun aber soll die Veränderung des Ortes dem Eisen zugeschrieben werden. (Foundation 121)

Judgment now has to come up with a new explanation for the situations in which the piece of iron moves and doesn’t move. The judgment that the iron was at rest “determined” the iron (“the determination of the iron…”), but it proved to be incorrect, thanks to a moment of suspended judgment in which we turned to experience to see whether our judgment was correct, in which our ‘determined’ judgment ‘The iron is at rest’ became the ‘determinable’ judgment ‘The iron is at rest or it is not at rest’. Fichte wants us to see that there are two ways of thinking about the iron being at rest: we can think of the it as both a determined judgment and a determinable judgment:

Who doesn’t see, that being at rest appears here in two very different meanings? – the first time unconditionally, the second time conditioned by the absence of the magnet?

Wer sieht nicht, dass Beharrlichkeit hier in zwei sehr verschiedenen Bedeutungen vorkomme? – das eine Mal unbedingt, das zweite Mal bedingt durch die Abwesenheit eines Magnets? (Foundation 121)

One way to interpret Fichte’s argument here is that the “unconditional” judgment is simply wrong; that any judgment of experience, any judgment about “substance” is necessarily conditional upon experience bearing it out. However, I don’t think that Fichte’s wants to fully reject the unconditional nature of judgments of experience. Judgments of experience are unconditional insofar as they, in the moment they are made, determine experience to be thus and so. A judgment is not provisional, but rather complete in itself. It doesn’t stop at what might be the case, but rather makes a claim all the way to what is the case. The philosophical challenge here is to see the “unconditional” as lying next to the “conditional”, as somehow coexisting in the same instant. This is the “determined determinability” of substance.

“B” as a determination of “A+B”

In this part of the synthesis, or indetermination of “A” and “A+B”, Fichte introduces a new idea, namely the determination of “A + B” no longer by “A” but by “B”:

In so far as B is itself determined, A + B can also be determined by it (i.e. by B), and, because an absolute relation is supposed to occur – and only such an absolute relation is supposed to comprise the totality we are searching for, A + B must be determined by B. Thus, when A + B is posited, and thereby A is posited under the sphere of the determinable, _ A + B is in turn determined by B_.

Insofern nun B selbst bestimmt ist, kann auch durch dasselbe A + B bestimmt werden, und da eine absolute Relation stattinden – nur sie die gesuchte Totalität ausfüllen soll, so muß es dadurch bestimmte werden. Mithin wird, wenn A + B gesetzt, und insofern A unter die Sphäre des Bestimmbaren gesetzt ist, A + B hinwiederum bestimmt durch B. (Foundation 121-2)

There is a way to read this based on our interpretation thus far according to which Fichte is simply pointing out that the operation of negation can be applied equally to both a proposition p and its negation ~p. According to such a reading, I apply the operation of negation to p to arrive at ~p - this would be “A + B determined by A” -, and I can equally apply the operation of negation to the negated proposition to arrive at the affirmed proposition: ~(~p) => p - this would be “A + B determined by B”. According to such a view, the negation is simply an operation the reverses the direction of a prediction, regardless of whether it is a negative or positive predication (“The iron is in motion”, “The iron is NOT in motion”).

However, we can see from Fichte’s further discussion of this principle that he, in fact, has something very different in mind. “B” must be thought of as a positive predication that is contrary to another positive predication “A”. The reason for this is that sensuous presence, that which is the case, has no negation. Only propositions have negation. This means that in the moment of “determinability”, when we turn to experience to see whether p is or is not the case, what greets us in experience is either p, or something else that is contrary to p, but not ~p. For example, when our proposition is “The cat is on the mat”, and we turn to the mat expecting to see a cat, but there is no cat, we don’t see a “not-cat”, as such a thing doesn’t exist, but rather we see, for example, the complete surface of the mat, and the propostion “The entire surface of the mat is visible” contradicts the proposition “The cat is on the mat”. This is what Fichte means when he, in his concluding remarks on this section describes the imagination:

The positing Self, by means of the most wonderful of its capacities, which we will in time more exactly determine, holds onto the dissapearing accident long enough to compare it with the accident that supplants it.

Das setzende Ich, durch das wunderbarste seiner Vermögen, das wir zu seiner Zeit näher bestimmen werden, hält das schwindende Accidens so lange fest, bis es dasjenige, wodurch dasselbe verdrängt wird, damit verglichen hat. (Foundation 124)

When we are determining the correctness of a judgment p, we turn to the realm of experience, and the way that the realm of experience informs us that p is not the case is through another picture that supports one or more contrary judgments q. The imagination has the job of weighing these competing judgments p and q, of calling both to mind until we can decide that the experience we have before us supports one or the other of the judgments (or neither, as the case may be).

In the final section, “A + B” takes on a new meaning. It is not merely the suspension of a judgment p, a wavering between p and ~p. It is the suspension of a judgment p in the face of another potential judgment q that is contrary to p. We can see clearly here that the act of turning to experience, the “determinable” state of “A + B”, is not a purely non-judgmental state of direct perception. It is the trying out of many possible and competing judgments that might fit or explain the perception. This helps us to understand the sense in which “A” and “A + B” determine “one another.” These are only separate moments when I, for example, assert p in the absense of direct evidence. For example, when I say that there is a tree behind me, I am relying on evidence other than the direct perception that there is a tree. Then, in the next “determinable” moment, I turn around to see whether there actually is a tree. But what about the more common case of looking directly at the tree, and saying “That is a tree”? Here, the judgment that there is a tree is present along with the various other perceptual judgments that might affirm or refute that judgment. Our judgments about the world are made directly in the face of evidence, or other perceptual and conceptual judgments, and that is the sense in which “A” and “A + B” mutually constitute one another.

We can see this new perspective playing out in the way Fichte applies this new perspective to the case of the “positing Self”, and then the case of the magnet. In the case of “positing” Fichte distinguishes two moments, “B” and “B + A”:

The object in general (here B) is the determined: being excluded by the subject (hier B + A ) is the determinable.

Das Objekt überhaupt (hier B) ist das Bestimmte: das Ausgeschlossensein durch das Subjekt (hier B + A) ist das Bestimmbare. (Foundation 122)

“B + A” re-examines the act of judging A through the perspective of the judgment B. In our terms, it re-examines the act of judging or doubting p from the perspective of what happens to a contrary judgment q. The crucial point is this: in judging p, we most certainly thereby exclude ~p, but we don’t necessarily exclude all possible contrary judgments q. When we say there is a cat on the mat, we don’t also in our minds enumerate all contrary cases of, for example, the mat being unoccupied, a dog occupying the mat, or a person, etc. And yet, at the moment when we turn to experience to ascertain the truth of p, we are potentially met by just such a contrary judgment q. In order to be met by the contrary judgment q, q must, in some sense be “in us” before we confirm it in experience. We must, so to speak, already be able to formulate the judgment q before we try it out on experience and see that it fits. And thus, in a retroactive sense, we see that our judgment p did exclude q, and if q is now the case, then p is not the case, and if q is not the case, then p can remain the case. Here is Fichte’s descripton of this argument:

Granted, the object is posited in the Self (for the possibility of its being excluded) in a manner that is completely incomprehensible to us, and thus indeed ought to be an object; neverthesless, it is accidental for the object that it be excluded, and, – as will become clear, as a result of this exclusion represented. It [i.e. the object] would also exist in itself – not outside of the Self, but within the Self, without this exclusion.

Es ist dem Objekte, wenn dasselbe gleich auf eine uns völlig unbegreifliche Art in dem Ich (für das mögliche Ausschließen) gesetzt, und insofern allerdings ein Objekt sein soll, zufällig, daß es ausgeschlossen, und, – wie sich ferner ergeben wird, zur Folge dieses Ausschließens vorgestellt wird. Es wäre an sich, – nicht außer dem Ich, aber im Ich, – ohne dieses Ausschlißen vorhanden. (_Foundation 122)

The “object” here is some proposition q about what might be the case that is contrary to my proposition p and therefore calls into question whether p is the case. In the example of the piece of iron, it is the proposition ‘The iron is in motion’, which contradicts my claim that the iron is at rest. Assuming that rest and motion are contraries, and not contradictory attributions (i.e. Not-rest does not imply motion, and visa versa), then as long as I am simply making the claim that the iron is at rest, I am not saying anything about it being or not being in motion. However, in turning to experience, I suddenly, in the face of perceptual evidence, consider the possibility that the magnet is in motion. In order to consider this new possibility, the notion of movement must already be available to me. In Fichte’s terms, the concept of motion must have already been present “within me”, before I try to apply it “outside myself”, i.e. apply it in the realm of experience to what is the case:

…if one is to oppose the iron with motion, then the motion must already be known. By means of the iron it is, however, not supposed to be known. Thus it is known from elsewhere…

…soll man die Bewegung dem Eisen entgegensetzen, so muß sie schon bekannt sein. Durch das Eisen aber soll sie nciht bekannt sein. Mithin ist sie anderwärts her bekannt… (Foundation 123)

We can call the judgment “The magnet is in motion” a contrary counterfactual. It is a judgment q that is contrary to p, and that, in the moment we judge p, must be counter to fact. Fichte distinguishes two cognitive moments with respect to this contrary counterfactual. In the first instance, the contrary counterfactual somehow exists “within us”, but we don’t necessarily think about it, nor are we necessarily aware of it. It exists unconsciously or semi-consciously in our imagination. This strange existence of the contrary counterfactual is needed to explain the next cognitive moment, namely the moment when we activate the counterfactual, when we start to doubt our judgment p and entertain the contrary proposition q. In this moment, we are ‘representing’ q, we are actively, consciously considering its possibility, and in so doing, we also see that, if q, then our judgment p must be incorrect. This is the second moment of the contrary counterfactual, when we actively consider it, and realize that such a counterfactual is excluded by our stance thus far. In this moment, our judgment p stands on a razor’s edge - potentially supplanted by a contrary judgment q. This moment of indecision is the moment of imagination that we quoted earlier:

The positing Self, by means of its most wonderful capacity…holds onto the disappearing accident long enough to compare it with that which replaces it.

Das setzende Ich, durch das wunderbarste seiner Vermögen…hält das schwindende Accidenz so lange fest, bis es dasjenige, wodurch dasselbe verdrängt wird, damit verglichen hat. (Foundation 124)

With this quote, we reach the conclusion of our reading of Fichte’s synthesis of substance. It remains for us to reflect on what Fichte achieves with this final turn in his argument, with this move from “synthesizing” “A” and “A + B” to considering now “B” and “B + A”. It seems to me that Fichte aims to achieve a kind of virtuous infinite regress, whereby every judgment about what is the case emerges out of a state of determinability that challenges any previous judgment that was held. In defining the relationship between “A” and “A + B” Fichte was able to describe the fallibility of every judgment A, how it can be challenged in experience through the consideration and observation of a contrary or contradictory judgment B. This describes the movement from a “determined” judgment, to a “determinable” state, in which the judgment is called into question. The final stage of Fichte’s synthesis, the characterization of “A + B” as “determined by B”, describes the movement from “determinability” to a new determinate judgment “B”. The interaction between “A” and “A + B” takes a judgment as its starting and describes the suspension of said judgment. The determination of “A + B” by the new judgment “B” describes the emergence of a new judgment from the state of suspension.

This circle from determinate judgment to determinability and back allows Fichte state the relativity of every objective judgment to every other objective judgment:

Thus, – and this was the synthetic propositon we presented above – the totality consists merely in the complete relation, and there is absolutely nothing firm in itself that determines the totality. The totality consists in the completeness of a relationship, and not of a reality.

Also – und das war der oben aufgestellte synthetische Satz – die Totalität besteht bloss in der vollständigen Relation, und es giebt überhaupt nichts an sich festes, was dieselbe bestimme. Die Totalität besteht in der Vollständigkeit eines Verhältnisses, nicht aber einer Realität. (Foundation 122)

Up until the final stage of the synthesis, up until Fichte’s account of “A + B” as “determined” the emerging, possible, judgment “B”, one might have been tempted to think that “determinability” is always a secondary state to that of determined judgment. According to this temptation, one could say that objective knowledge might find this or that judgment challenged, but judgment in general provides the solid foundation of what we know. In the final stage of his argument, Fichte challenges this temptation, arguing that even our firmest judgments about what is the case are achieved through a process of determinability, in which these supposedly firm judgments where themselves only possible judgments that, at their point in time, challenged whatever judgments came before them.

Quoted from Ian Blecher, in his article “Kant on Formal Modality”:

Traditionally, logicians had characterized judging, as opposed to mere predicating, in terms of what they called “assent” or sometimes “positing” (Latin: assensus, ponere aliquid; German: annehmen)…[Assent] was opposed to the withholding of assent – as in an hypothesis or an expression of doubt. (Blecher, 5)
↩︎
The idea of judgment as excluding the contradictory judgment comes from Rödl, Self-Consciousness and Objectivity:

In judging, thinking my judgment valid, I exclude the contrary judgment: judging that things are so, I exclude that they are not. (Rödl 104)
↩︎
Fichte is following here a Kantian understanding of the modalities of judgments (possible, assertoric, apodictic) as potentially all active in the act of judgment. This idea I take from Blecher via Rödl. Blecher states:

the modal values persist from one to the next. The same possibility which is represented in a problematic judgment is also represented in an assertoric judgment; the same actuality which is represented in an assertoric judgment is also represented in an apodeictic judgment. Actuality includes possibility; necessity includes actuality. The progress of modalities is not, therefore, a change of mind. In this respect, it is not like going from withholding assent to giving it.

And here is Rödl’s take on the same point, following Blecher:

An assertoric judgment is potentially apodictic. Again, this modality of the judgment is self-conscious: in judging, I understand my assertoric judgment to be such as to rest on sufficient grounds; I understand it to be such as to be apodictic. (Rödl 126)

and Rödl again:

in a judgment of perception, I think what I judge to be not excluded by science. And what is known in a judgment of perception asks for an explanation. When it is explained, the judgment is apodictic, I comprehend its necessity in the light of what explains that which I judge. (Rödl 126)
↩︎
He uses the notion four times for each of the syntheses of form and matter (see the diagram from the previous blog post), and also in his preliminary explanation of how these syntheses are supposed to work, name §4.E.III.α and §4.E.III.β. ↩︎
Interestingly, there appears to be no decisiveness regarding the suspension of judgment. One is entertaining a judgment with some degree of uncertainty. This, it semms to me, indicates that the suspension of judgment is parasitic upon judgment; it represents a defective use of judgment. ↩︎
To this point, I find Colin Johnston’s article “That which ‘is true’ must already contain the verb: Wittgenstein’s rejection of Frege’s separation of judgment from content” particularly illuminating: “…in order to assert, the subject must determine the condition under which her act is correct.” ↩︎
There is extensive contemporary philosophical debate on this issue or which perceptual is the kind of conceptual act that can be characterized as a judgment or judgment-like. For example, John McDowell’s characterization of Sollars:

Sellars shows us how to understand visual experiences as ostensible seeings, occurrences in a subject’s visual life that “contain” clamls about an ostensibly visible region of objective reality. That they “contain” claims is the same fact as that they are conceptual occurrences, actualizations of conceptual capacities with a suitable “logical” togetherness. In that respect they are like judgments. But they are unlike judgments in the way in which they “contain” their claims. Judgments are free exercises of conceptual capacities with a suitable togetherness. But in an ostensible seeing whose content includes that of a given judgment, the same conceptual capacities are actualized, with the same togetherness, in a way that is ostensibly necessitated by the objective reality that is ostensibly seen. A visual experience is a case of being under the visual impression that things are thus-and-so in the ostensibly visible environment. (John McDowell, Having the World in View, 44)
↩︎